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Abstract. The Fiat-Shamir transformation is a famous technique to turn identification schemes
into signature schemes. The derived scheme is provably secure in the random-oracle model
against classical adversaries. Still, the technique has also been suggested to be used in connec-
tion with quantum-immune identification schemes, in order to get quantum-immune signature
schemes. However, a recent paper by Boneh et al. (Asiacrypt 2011) has raised the issue that
results in the random-oracle model may not be immediately applicable to quantum adversaries,
because such adversaries should be allowed to query the random oracle in superposition. It has
been unclear if the Fiat-Shamir technique is still secure in this quantum oracle model (QROM).
Here, we discuss that giving proofs for the Fiat-Shamir transformation in the QROM is pre-
sumably hard. We show that there cannot be black-box extractors, as long as the underlying
quantum-immune identification scheme is secure against active adversaries and the first mes-
sage of the prover is independent of its witness. Most schemes are of this type. We then discuss
that for some schemes one may be able to resurrect the Fiat-Shamir result in the QROM by
modifying the underlying protocol first. We discuss in particular a version of the Lyubashevsky
scheme which is provably secure in the QROM.
1 Introduction
The Fiat-Shamir transformation [FS87] is a well-known method to remove interaction in three-
move identification schemes between a prover and verifier, by letting the verifier’s challenge ch
be determined via a hash function H applied to the prover’s first message com. Currently, the
only generic, provably secure instantiation is by modeling the hash function H as a random oracle
[BR93, PS00]. In general, finding secure instantiations based on standard hash functions is hard
for some schemes, as shown in [GK03, BDSG+13]. However, these negative results usually rely on
peculiar identification schemes, such that for specific schemes, especially more practical ones, such
instantiations may still be possible.
The Quantum Random-Oracle model Recently, the Fiat-Shamir transformation has also
been applied to schemes which are advertised as being based on quantum-immune primitives,
e.g., [Lyu09, BM10, GKV10, CLRS10, CVA10, SSH11, MGS11, Sak12, GLP12, AFLT12, CNR12,
AJLA+12]. Interestingly, the proofs for such schemes still investigate classical adversaries only. It
seems unclear if (and how) one can transfer the proofs to the quantum case. Besides the prob-
lem that the classical Fiat-Shamir proof [PS00] relies on rewinding the adversary, which is often
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considered to be critical for quantum adversaries (albeit not impossible [Wat06, Unr12]), a bigger
discomfort seems to lie in the usage of the random-oracle model in presence of quantum adversaries.
As pointed out by Boneh et al. [BDF+11] the minimal requirement for random oracles in the
quantum world should be quantum access. Since the random oracle is eventually replaced by a
standard hash function, a quantum adversary could evaluate this hash function in superposition,
while still ignoring any advanced attacks exploiting the structure of the actual hash function. To
reflect this in the random-oracle model, [BDF+11] argue that the quantum adversary should be
also allowed to query the random oracle in superposition. That is, the adversary should be able
to query the oracle on a state |ϕ〉 = ∑x αx |x〉 |0〉 and in return would get ∑x αx |x〉 |H(x)〉. This
model is called the quantum random-oracle model (QROM).
Boneh et al. [BDF+11] discuss some classical constructions for encryption and signatures which
remain secure in the QROM. They do not cover Fiat-Shamir signatures, though. Subsequently,
Boneh and Zhandry [Zha12b, Zha12a, BZ12] investigate further primitives with quantum access,
such as pseudorandom functions and MACs. Still, the question about the security of the Fiat-
Shamir transform in the QROM raised in [BDF+11] remained open.
Fiat-Shamir Transform in the QROM Here, we give evidence that conducting security proofs
for Fiat-Shamir transformed schemes and black-box adversaries is hard, thus yielding a negative
result about the provable security of such schemes. More specifically, we use the meta-reduction
technique to rule out the existence of quantum extractors with black-box access to a quantum
adversary against the converted (classical) scheme. If such extractors would exist then the meta-
reduction, together with the extractor, yields a quantum algorithm which breaks the active security
of the identification scheme. Our result covers any identification scheme, as long as the prover’s
initial commitment in the scheme is independent of the witness, and if the scheme itself is secure
against active quantum attacks where a malicious verifier may first interact with the genuine prover
before trying to impersonate or, as we only demand here, to compute a witness afterwards. Albeit
not quantum-immune, the classical schemes of Schnorr [Sch90], Guillou and Quisquater [GQ90], and
Feige, Fiat and Shamir [FFS88] are conceivably of this type (see also [BP02]). Quantum-immune
candidates are, for instance, [MV03, Lyu08, KTX08, MGS11, SSH11, AJLA+12].
Our negative result does not primarily rely on the rewinding problem for quantum adversaries;
our extractor may rewind the adversary (in a black-box way). Instead, our result is rather based on
the adversary’s possibility to hide actual queries to the quantum random oracle in a “superposition
cloud”, such that the extractor or simulator cannot elicit or implant necessary information for
such queries. In fact, our result reveals a technical subtlety in the QROM which previous works
[BDF+11, Zha12a, Zha12b, BZ12] have not addressed at all, or at most implicitly. It refers to the
question how a simulator or extractor can answer superposition queries
∑
x αx |x〉 |0〉.
A possible option is to allow the simulator to reply with an arbitrary quantum state |ψ〉 =∑
x βx |x〉 |yx〉, e.g., by swapping the state from its local registers to the ancilla bits for the answer
in order to make this step unitary. This seems to somehow generalize the classical situation where
the simulator on input x returns an arbitrary string y for H(x). Yet, the main difference is that
returning an arbitrary state |ψ〉 could also be used to eliminate some of the input values x, i.e., by
setting βx = 0. This is more than what the simulator is able to do in the classical setting, where the
adversary can uniquely identify the preimage x to the answer. In the extreme the simulator in the
quantum case, upon receiving a (quantum version of) a classical state |x〉 |0〉, could simply reply
with an (arbitrary) quantum state |ψ〉. Since quantum states are in general indistinguishable, in
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contrast to the classical case the adversary here would potentially continue its execution for inputs
which it has not queried for.
In previous works [BDF+11, Zha12b, Zha12a, BZ12] the simulator specifies a classical (possibly
probabilistic) function h which maps the adversary query
∑
x αx |x〉 |0〉 to the reply
∑
x αx |x〉 |h(x)〉.
Note that the function h is not given explicitly to the adversary, and that it can thus implement
keyed functions like a pseudorandom function (as in [BDF+11]). This basically allows the simulator
to freely assign values h(x) to each string x, without being able to change the input values. It also
corresponds to the idea that, if the random oracle is eventually replaced by an actual hash function,
the quantum adversary can check that the hash function is classical, even if the adversary does not
aim to exploit any structural weaknesses (such that we still hide h from the adversary).
We thus adopt the approach of letting the simulator determine the quantum answer via a
classical probabilistic function h. In fact, our impossibility hinges on this property but which we
believe to be rather “natural” for the aforementioned reasons. From a mere technical point of view
it at least clearly identifies possible venues to bypass our hardness result. In our case we allow the
simulator to specify the (efficient) function h adaptively for each query, still covering techniques
like programmability in the classical setting. Albeit this is sometimes considered to be a doubtful
property [FLR+10] this strengthens our impossibility result in this regard.
Positive Results We conclude with some positive result. It remains open if one can “rescue”
plain Fiat-Shamir for schemes which are not actively secure, or to prove that alternative but still
reasonably efficient approaches work. However, we can show that the Fiat-Shamir technique in
general does provide a secure signature scheme in the QROM if the protocol allows for oblivious
commitments. Roughly, this means that the honest verifier generates the prover’s first message
com obliviously by sampling a random string and sends com to the prover. In the random oracle
transformed scheme the commitment is thus computed via the random oracle, together with the
challenge. Such schemes are usually not actively secure against malicious verifiers. Nonetheless,
we stress that in order to derive a secure signature scheme via the Fiat-Shamir transform, the
underlying identification scheme merely needs to provide passive security and honest-verifier zero-
knowledge.
To make the above transformation work, we need that the prover is able to compute the response
for commitments chosen obliviously to the prover. For some schemes this is indeed possible if the
prover holds some trapdoor information. Albeit not quantum-immune, it is instructive to look at
the Guillou-Quisquater RSA-based proof of knowledge [GQ90] where the prover shows knowledge of
w ∈ Z∗N with we = y mod N for x = (e,N, y). For an oblivious commitment the prover would need
to compute an e-th root for a given commitment R ∈ Z∗N . If the witness would contain the prime
factorization of N , instead of the e-th root of y, this would indeed be possible. As a concrete
example we discuss that we can still devise a provably secure signature version of Lyubashevsky’s
identification scheme [Lyu12] via our method. Before, Lyubashevsky only showed security in the
classical random-oracle model, despite using an allegedly quantum-immune primitive.
Our results are summarized in Figure 1. Actively secure identification schemes with witness-
independent commitments (lower right area) are hard to prove secure in the quantum random
oracle model. Schemes with oblivious and therefore witness-independent commitments can be
proven secure (upper right area). Schemes outside of this area may be patched according to our
idea exemplified for Lyubashevsky’s scheme to turn them into secure signature schemes in the
QROM. For any other identification scheme the question remains open.
3
Figure 1: Possibility and impossibility results for the Fiat-Shamir transform of identification schemes in the QROM.
Related work Since the introduction of the quantum-accessible random-oracle model [BDF+11],
several works propose cryptographic primitives or revisit their security against quantum algorithms
in this stronger model [Zha12a, Zha12b, BZ12]. In [DFNS11], Damg˚ard et al. look at the security
of cryptographic protocols where the underlying primitives or even parties can be queried by an
adversary in a superposition. We here investigate the scenario in which the quantum adversary can
only interact classically with the classical honest parties, except for the locally evaluable random
oracle.
In a concurrent and independent work, Boneh and Zhandry [BZ13] analyze the security of
signature schemes under quantum chosen-message attacks, i.e., the adversary in the unforgeability
notion of the signature scheme may query the signing oracle in superposition and, eventually, in the
quantum random oracle model. Our negative result carries over to the quantum chosen-message
attack model as well, since our impossibility holds even allowing only classical queries to the signing
oracle. Moreover, while the authors of [BZ13] show how to obtain signature schemes secure in the
quantum-accessible signing oracle model, starting with schemes secure in the classical sense, we
focus on signature schemes and proofs of knowledge derived from identification schemes via the
Fiat-Shamir paradigm.
2 Preliminaries
We first describe (to the level we require it) quantum computations and then recall the quantum
random-oracle model of Boneh et al. [BDF+11]. We also introduce the notion of Σ-protocols to
which the Fiat-Shamir transformation applies. In the end of this section, we recall the definition
of signature schemes and its security.
2.1 Quantum Computations in the QROM
We first briefly recall facts about quantum computations and set some notation; for more details,
we refer to [NC00]. Our description follows [BDF+11] closely.
Quantum Systems A quantum system A is associated to a complex Hilbert space HA of finite
dimension and with an inner product 〈·|·〉. The state of the system is given by a (class of) normalized
4
vector |ϕ〉 ∈ HA with Euclidean norm ‖ |ϕ〉 ‖ =
√〈ϕ|ϕ〉 = 1.
The joint or composite quantum state of two quantum systems A and B over spaces HA and
HB, respectively, is given through the tensor product HA ⊗HB. The product state of |ϕA〉 ∈ HA
and |ϕB〉 ∈ HB is denoted by |ϕA〉 ⊗ |ϕB〉. We sometimes simply write |ϕA〉 |ϕB〉 or |ϕA, ϕB〉. An
n-qubit system is associated in the joint quantum system of n two-dimensional Hilbert spaces. The
standard orthonormal computational basis |x〉 for such a system is given by |x〉 = |x1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xn〉
for x = x1 . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n. We often assume that any (classical) bit string x is encoded into a
quantum state as |x〉, and vice versa we sometimes view such a state simply as a classical state.
Any pure n-qubit state |ϕ〉 can be expressed as a superposition in the computational basis as
|ϕ〉 = ∑x∈{0,1}n αx |x〉 where αx are complex amplitudes obeying ∑x∈{0,1}n |αx|2 = 1.
Quantum Computations Evolutions of quantum systems are described by unitary transforma-
tions with IA being the identity transformation on register A. For a composite quantum system
over HA ⊗HB and a transformation UA acting only on HA, it is understood that UA |ϕA〉 |ϕB〉 is
a simplification of (UA ⊗ IB) |ϕA〉 |ϕB〉. Note that any unitary operation and, thus, any quantum
operation, is invertible.
Information can be extracted from a quantum state |ϕ〉 by performing a positive-operator valued
measurement (POVM) M = {Mi}i with positive semi-definite measurement operators Mi that sum
to the identity
∑
iMi = I. Outcome i is obtained with probability pi = 〈ϕ|Mi |ϕ〉. A special case
are projective measurements such as the measurement in the computational basis of the state
|ϕ〉 = ∑x αx |x〉 which yields outcome x with probability |αx|2. Measurements can refer to a subset
of quantum registers and are in general not invertible.
We model a quantum algorithm AQ with access to oracles O1, O2, . . . by a sequence of unitary
transformations
U1, O1, U2, . . . , OT−1, UT
over m = poly(n) qubits. Here, oracle function Oi : {0, 1}a → {0, 1}b maps the final a + b qubits
from basis state |x〉 |y〉 to |x〉 |y ⊕Oi(x)〉 for x ∈ {0, 1}a and y ∈ {0, 1}b. This mapping is inverse
to itself. We can let the oracles share (secret) state by reserving some qubits for the Oi’s only, on
which the Uj ’s cannot operate. Note that the algorithm AQ may also receive some (quantum) input
|ψ〉. The adversary may also perform measurements. We sometimes write A|O1(·)〉,|O2(·)〉,...Q (|ψ〉) for
the output.
To introduce asymptotics we assume that AQ is actually a sequence of such transformation
sequences, indexed by parameter n, and that each transformation sequence is composed out of
quantum systems for input, output, oracle calls, and work space (of sufficiently many qubits). To
measure polynomial running time, we assume that each Ui is approximated (to sufficient precision)
by members of a set of universal gates (say, Hadamard, phase, CNOT and pi/8; for sake of con-
creteness [NC00]), where at most polynomially many gates are used. Furthermore, T = T (n) is
assumed to be polynomial, too.
Quantum Random Oracles We can now define the quantum random-oracle model by picking
a random function H for a given domain and range, and letting (a subset of) the oracles Oi evaluate
H on the input in superposition, namely those Oi’s which correspond to hash oracle queries. In this
case the quantum adversary can evaluate the hash function in parallel for many inputs by querying
the oracle about
∑
x αx |x〉 and obtaining
∑
x αx |H(x)〉, appropriately encoded as described above.
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Note that the output distribution A|O1(·)〉,|O2(·)〉,...Q (|ψ〉) now refers to the AQ’s measurements and
the choice of H (and the random choices for the other oracles, if existing).
2.2 Classical Interactive Proofs of Knowledge
Here, we review the basic definition of Σ-protocols and show the classical Fiat-Shamir transfor-
mation which converts the interactive Σ-protocols into non-interactive proof of knowledge (PoK)
protocols (in the random-oracle model).
Let L ∈ NP be a language with a (polynomially computable) relation R, i.e., x ∈ L if and only
if there exists some w ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that R(x,w) = 1 and |w| = poly(|x|) for any x. As usual, w is
called a witness for x ∈ L (and x is sometimes called a “theorem” or statement). We sometimes use
the notation Rλ to denote the set of pairs (x,w) in R of some complexity related to the security
parameter, e.g., if |x| = λ.
Σ-Protocols The well-known class of Σ-protocols between a prover P and a verifier V allows P
to convince V that it knows a witness w for a public theorem x ∈ L, without giving V non-trivially
computable information beyond this fact. Informally, a Σ-protocol consists of three messages
(com, ch, rsp) where the first message com is sent by P and the challenge ch is sampled uniformly
from a challenge space by the verifier. We write (com, ch, rsp)← 〈P(x,w),V(x)〉 for the randomized
output of an interaction between P and V. We denote individual messages of the (stateful) prover
in such an execution by com ← P(x,w) and rsp ← P(x,w, com, ch), respectively. Analogously, we
denote the verifier’s steps by ch← V(x, com) and d← V(x, com, ch, rsp) for the challenge step and
the final decision.
Definition 2.1 (Σ-Protocol) A Σ-protocol (P,V) for an NP-relation R satisfies the following
properties:
Completeness. For any security parameter λ, any (x,w) ∈ Rλ, any (com, ch, rsp)← 〈P(x,w),V(x)〉
it holds V(x, com, ch, rsp) = 1.
Public-Coin. For any security parameter λ, any (x,w) ∈ Rλ, and any com ← P(x,w), the
challenge ch← V(x, com) is uniform on {0, 1}`(λ) where ` is some polynomial function.
Special Soundness. Given (com, ch, rsp) and (com, ch′, rsp′) for x ∈ L (with ch 6= ch′) where
V(x, com, ch, rsp) = V(x, com, ch′, rsp′) = 1, there exists a PPT algorithm Ext (the extractor)
which for any such input outputs a witness w ← Ext(x, com, ch, rsp, ch′, rsp′) for x satisfying
R(x,w) = 1.
Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge (HVZK). There exists a PPT algorithm Sim (the zero-
knowledge simulator) which, on input x ∈ L, outputs a transcript (com, ch, rsp) that is com-
putationally indistinguishable from a valid transcript derived in a P-V interaction. That is,
for any polynomial-time quantum algorithm D = (D0,D1) the following distributions are in-
distinguishable:
• Let (x,w, state)← D0(1λ). If R(x,w) = 1, then (com, ch, rsp)← 〈P(x,w),V(x)〉;
else, (com, ch, rsp)← ⊥. Output D1(com, ch, rsp, state).
• Let (x,w, state)← D0(1λ). If R(x,w) = 1, then (com, ch, rsp)← Sim(x);
else, (com, ch, rsp)← ⊥. Output D1(com, ch, rsp, state).
6
Here, state can be a quantum state.
Fiat-Shamir (FS) Transformation The Fiat-Shamir transformation of a Σ-protocol (P,V)
is the same protocol but where the computation of ch is done as ch ← H(x, com) instead of
← V(x, com). Here, H is a public hash function which is usually modeled as a random oracle,
in which case we speak of the Fiat-Shamir transformation of (P,V) in the random-oracle model.
Note that we include x in the hash computation, but all of our results remain valid if x is omitted
from the input. If applying the FS transformation to a (passively-secure) identification protocol
one obtains a signature scheme, if the hash computation also includes the message m to be signed.
2.3 Quantum Extractors and the FS Transform
Quantum Extractors in the QROM Next, we describe a black-box quantum extractor.
Roughly, this extractor should be able to output a witness w for a statement x given black-box
access to the adversarial prover. There are different possibilities to define this notion, e.g., see the
discussion in [Unr12]. Here, we take a simple approach which is geared towards the application of
the FS transform to build secure signature schemes. Namely, we assume that, if a quantum adver-
sary AQ on input x and with access to a quantum-accessible random oracle has a non-negligible
probability of outputting a valid proof (com, ch, rsp), then there is an extractor KQ which on input
x and with black-box access to AQ outputs a valid witness with non-negligible probability, too.
We need to specify how the extractor simulates the quantum-accessible random oracle. This time
we view the extractor KQ as a sequence of unitary transformations U1, U2, U3, . . . , interleaved with
interactions with the adversary AQ, now represented as the sequence of (stateful) oracles O1, O2, . . .
to which KQ has access to. Here each Oi corresponds to the local computations of the adversary
until the “next interaction with the outside world”. In our case this will be basically the hash queries
|ϕ〉 to the quantum-accessible random oracle. We stipulate KQ to write the (circuit description of
a) classical function h with the expected input/output length, and which we assume for the moment
to be deterministic, in some register before making the next call to an oracle. Before this call is
then actually made, the hash function h is first applied to the quantum state |ϕ〉 = ∑x αx |x〉 |0〉
of the previous oracle in the sense that the next oracle is called with
∑
x αx |x〉 |h(x)〉. Note that
we can enforce this behavior formally by restricting KQ’s steps U1, U2, . . . to be of this described
form above.
At some point the adversary will return some classical proof (com, ch, rsp) for x. To allow the
extractor to rewind the adversary we assume that the extractor can invoke another run with the
adversary (for the same randomness, or possibly fresh randomness, appropriately encoded in the
behavior of oracles). If the reduction asks to keep the same randomness then since the adversary
only receives classical input x, this corresponds to a reset to the initial state. Since we do not
consider adversaries with auxiliary quantum input, but only with classical input, such resets are
admissible.
For our negative result we assume that the adversary does not perform any measurements
before eventually creating the final output, whereas our positive result also works if the adversary
measures in between. This is not a restriction, since in the meta-reduction technique we are allowed
to choose a specific adversary, without having to consider more general cases. Note that the intrinsic
“quantum randomness” of the adversary is fresh for each rewound run but, for our negative result,
since measurements of the adversary are postponed till the end, the extractor can re-create the
same quantum state as before at every interaction point. Also note that the extractor can measure
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any quantum query of the adversary to the random oracle but then cannot continue the simulation
of this instance (unless the adversary chose a classical query in the first place). The latter reflects
the fact that the extractor cannot change the quantum input state for answering the adversary’s
queries to the random oracle.
In summary, the black-box extractor can: (a) run several instances of the adversary from the
start for the same or fresh classical randomness, possibly reaching the same quantum state as
in previous executions when the adversary interacts with external oracles, (b) for each query to
the QRO either measure and abort this execution, or provide a hash function h, and (c) observe
the adversary’s final output. The black-box extractor cannot, for instance, interfere with the
adversary’s program and postpone or perform additional measurements, nor rewind the adversary
between interactions with the outside world, nor tamper with the internal state of the adversary. As
a consequence, the extractor cannot observe the adversary’s queries, but we still allow the extractor
to access queries if these are classical. In particular, the extractor may choose h adaptively but not
based on quantum queries (only on classical queries). We motivate this model with the observation
that, in meaningful scenarios, the extractor should only be able to give a classical description of h,
which is then “quantum-implemented” by the adversary AQ through a “quantum programmable
oracle gate”; the gate itself will be part of the adversary’s circuit, and hence will be outside the
extractor’s influence. Purification of the adversary is also not allowed, since this would discard
those adversaries which perform measurements, and would hence hinder the notion of black-box
access.
For an interesting security notion computing a witness from x only should be infeasible, even
for a quantum adversary. To this end we assume that there is an efficient instance generator Inst
which on input 1λ outputs a pair (x,w) ∈ R such that any polynomial-time quantum algorithm on
(classical) input x returns some classical string w′ with (x,w′) ∈ R, is negligible (over the random
choices of Inst and the quantum algorithm). We say Inst is a hard instance generator for relation R.
Definition 2.2 (Black-Box Extractor for Σ-Protocol in the QROM) Let (P,V) be a Σ-pro-
tocol for an NP-relation R with hard instance generator Inst. Then a black-box extractor KQ is
a polynomial-time quantum algorithm (as above) such that for any quantum adversary AQ with
quantum access to oracle H, it holds that, if
Prob
[
VH(x, com, ch, rsp) = 1 for (x,w)← Inst(1λ); (com, ch, rsp)← A|H〉Q (x)
]
6≈ 0
is not negligible, then
Prob
[
(x,w′) ∈ R for (x,w)← Inst(1λ);w′ ← KAQQ (x)
]
6≈ 0
is also not negligible.
For our negative (and our positive) results we look at special cases of black-box extractors, denoted
input-respecting extractors. This
means that the extractor only runs the adversary on the given input x. All known extractors
are of this kind, and in general it is unclear how to take advantage of executions for different x′.
On Probabilistic Hash Functions We note that we could also allow the extractor to output
a description of a probabilistic hash function h to answer each random oracle call. This means
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that, when evaluated for some string x, the reply is y = h(x; r) for some randomness r (which
is outside of the extractor’s control). In this sense a query |ϕ〉 = ∑x αx |x〉 |0〉 in superposition
returns |ϕ〉 = ∑x αx |x〉 |h(x; rx)〉 for independently chosen rx for each x.
We can reduce the case of probabilistic functions h to deterministic ones, if we assume quantum-
accessible pseudorandom functions [BDF+11]. These functions are indistinguishable from random
functions for quantum adversaries, even if queried in superposition. In our setting, in the determin-
istic case the extractor incorporates the description of the pseudorandom function for a randomly
chosen key κ into the description of the deterministic hash function, h′(x) = h(x;PRFκ(x)). Since
the hash function description is not presented to the adversary, using such derandomized hash
functions cannot decrease the extractor’s success probability significantly. This argument can be
carried out formally by a reduction to the quantum-accessible pseudorandom function, i.e., by for-
warding each query |ϕ〉 of the QROM adversary to the random or pseudorandom function oracle,
and evaluating h as before on x and the oracle’s reply. Using a general technique in [Zha12b] we
can even replace the assumption about the pseudorandom function and use a q-wise independent
function instead.
2.4 Signature Schemes and Their Security
Here, we recall the definition of signature schemes and their security.
Definition 2.3 (Signature Scheme) A (digital) signature scheme (in the random-oracle model)
consists of three efficient algorithms (SKGen, Sig, SVf) defined as follows.
Key Generation. On input the security parameter 1λ, the probabilistic algorithm SKGenH with
oracle access to H outputs a key pair (sk, pk) where sk (resp. pk) denotes the signing key
(resp. public verification key).
Signing. On input a signing key sk and a message m, the probabilistic algorithm SigH outputs a
signature σ.
Verification. On input the verification key pk, a message m, and a signature σ, the deterministic
algorithm SVfH outputs either 1 (= valid) or 0 (= invalid).
We require correctness of the verification, i.e., the verifier will always accept genuine signatures.
More formally, for any security parameter λ, any (sk, pk) ← SKGen(1λ), for any message m, any
signature σ ← Sig(sk,m), we have SVf(pk,m, σ) = 1.
From a signature scheme we require that no outsider should be able to forge signatures. Formally,
this property is called unforgeability against adaptively chosen-message attacks (unf-cma) and is
defined as follows.
Definition 2.4 (UNF-CMA Security) A (digital) signature scheme S = (SKGen,Sig,SVf) in
the random-oracle model is (t, Q, ε)-unforgeable against adaptively chosen-message attacks with Q =
(qH , qS) if for any algorithm A with runtime t and making at most qH (resp. qS) queries to the
random oracle (resp. its signing oracle), the probability that the following experiment returns 1 is
at most ε.
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pick random function H
(sk, pk)
$←− SKGenH(1λ)
(m∗, σ∗) $←− AH,SigH(sk,·)(pk)
Return 1 iff SVfH(pk,m∗, σ∗) = 1 and m∗ /∈ M.
Here, M is the set of message queried to SigH(sk, ·).
The probability is taken over all coin tosses of SKGen, Sig, and A, and the choice of H.
We call a signature scheme existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks in the (quantum)
random-oracle model if for any PPT (quantum) algorithm making at most polynomial number of
(superposition) queries to the (quantum) random oracle and classical queries to the signature
scheme, the probability for the above experiment is negligible in the security parameter.
3 Impossibility Result for Quantum-Fiat-Shamir
We use meta-reductions techniques to show that, if the Fiat-Shamir transformation applied to the
identification protocol would support a knowledge extractor, then we would obtain a contradiction
to the active security. That is, we first build an all-powerful quantum adversary AQ successfully
generating accepted proofs. Coming up with such an adversary is necessary to ensure that a black-
box extractor KQ exists in the first place; Definition 2.2 only requires KQ to succeed if there is
some successful adversary AQ. The adversary AQ uses its unbounded power to find a witness w
to its input x, and then uses the quantum access to the random oracle model to “hide” its actual
query in a superposition. The former ensures that that our adversary is trivially able to construct a
valid proof by emulating the prover for w, the latter prevents the extractor to apply the rewinding
techniques of Pointcheval and Stern [PS00] in the classical setting. Once we have designed our
adversary AQ and ensured the existence of KQ, we wrap KQ into a reduction MQ which takes
the role of AQ and breaks active security. The (quantum) meta-reduction now plays against the
honest prover of the identification scheme “on the outside”, using the extractor “on the inside”. In
this inner interaction MQ needs to emulate our all-powerful adversary AQ towards the extractor,
but this needs to be done efficiently in order to make sure that the meta-reduction (with its inner
interactions) is efficient.
In the argument below we assume that the extractor is input-respecting (i.e., forwards x faith-
fully to the adversary). In this case we can easily derandomize the adversary (with respect to
classical randomness) by “hardwiring” a key of a random function into it, which it initially applies
to its input x to recover the same classical randomness for each run. Since the extractor has to work
for all adversaries, it in particular needs to succeed for those where we pick the function randomly
but fix it from thereon.
3.1 Assessment
Before we dive into the technical details of our result let us re-assess the strength and weaknesses
of our impossibility result:
1. The extractor has to choose a classical hash function h for answering QRO queries. While this
may be considered a restriction in general interactive quantum proofs, it seems to be inevitable
in the QROM; it is rather a consequence of the approach where a quantum adversary mounts
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attacks in a classical setting. After all, both the honest parties as well as the adversary expect
a classical hash function. The adversary is able to check this property easily, even if it treats
the hash function otherwise as a black box (and may thus not be able to spot that the hash
function uses (pseudo)randomness). We remark again that this approach also complies with
previous efforts [BDF+11, Zha12b, Zha12a, BZ12] and our positive result here to answer such
hash queries.
2. The extractor can rewind the quantum adversary to any point before the final measurement.
Recall that for our impossibility result we assume, to the advantage of the extractor, that
the adversary does not perform any measurement until the very end. Since the extractor
can re-run the adversary from scratch for the same classical randomness, and the “no-cloning
restriction” does not apply to our adversary with classical input, the extractor can therefore
easily put the adversary in the same (quantum) state as in a previous execution, up to the
final measurement. However, because we consider black-box extractors, the extractor can only
influence the adversary’s behavior via the answers it provides toAQ’s external communication.
In this sense, the extractor may always rewind the adversary to such communication points.
We also allow the extractor to measure and abort at such communication points.
3. The extraction strategy by Pointcheval and Stern [PS00] in the purely classical case can be
cast in our black-box extractor framework. For this the extractor would run the adversary for
the same classical randomness twice, providing a lazy-sampling based hash function descrip-
tion, with different replies in the i-th answers in the two runs. The extractor then extracts the
witness from two valid signatures. This shows that a different approach than in the classical
setting is necessary for extractors in the QROM.
3.2 Prerequisites
Witness-Independent Commitments We first identify a special subclass of Σ-protocols which
our result relies upon:
Definition 3.1 (Σ-protocols with witness-independent commitment) A Σ-protocol has wit-
ness-independent commitments if the prover’s commitment com does not depend on the witness w.
That is, we assume that there is a PPT algorithm Com which, on input x and some randomness r,
produces the same distribution as the prover’s first message for input (x,w).
Examples of such Σ-protocols are the well known graph-isomorphism proof [GMW87], the Schnorr
proof of knowledge [Sch91], or the recent protocol for lattices used in an anonymous credential
system [CNR12]. A typical example of non-witness-independent commitment Σ-protocol is the
graph 3-coloring ZKPoK scheme [GMW87] where the prover commits to a random permutation of
the coloring.
We note that perfectly hiding commitments do not suffice for our negative result. We need to
be able to generate (the superposition of) all commitments without knowledge of the witness.
Weak Security Against Active Quantum Adversaries We next describe the underlying se-
curity of (non-transformed) Σ-protocols against a weak form of active attacks where the adversary
may use quantum power but needs to eventually compute a witness. That is, we let AP(x,w)Q (x)
be a quantum adversary which can interact classically with several prover instances. The prover
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Figure 2: The canonical adversary
instances can be invoked in sequential order, each time the prover starts by computing a fresh com-
mitment com← P(x,w), and upon receiving a challenge ch ∈ {0, 1}` it computes the response rsp.
Only if it has returned this response P can be invoked on a new session again. We say that the
adversary succeeds in an active attack if it eventually returns some w′ such that (x,w′) ∈ R.
For an interesting security notion computing a witness from x only should be infeasible, even
for a quantum adversary. To this end we assume that there is an efficient instance generator Inst
which on input 1λ outputs a pair (x,w) ∈ R such that any polynomial-time quantum algorithm on
(classical) input x returns some classical string w′ with (x,w′) ∈ R, is negligible (over the random
choices of Inst and the quantum algorithm). We say Inst is a hard instance generator for relation R.
Definition 3.2 (Weakly Secure Σ-Protocol Against Active Quantum Adversaries) A Σ-
protocol (P,V) for an NP-relation R with hard instance generator Inst is weakly secure against
active quantum adversaries if for any polynomial-time quantum adversaries AQ the probability that
AP(x,w)Q (x) succeeds in an active attack for (x,w)← Inst(1λ) is negligible (as a function of λ).
We call this property weak security because it demands the adversary to compute a witness w′,
instead of passing only an impersonation attempt. If the adversary finds such a witness, then
completeness of the scheme implies that it can successfully impersonate. In this sense we put more
restrictions on the adversary and, thus, weaken the security guarantees.
3.3 The Adversary and the Meta-Reduction
Adversary Our (unbounded) adversary works roughly as follows (see Figure 2). It receives as
input a value x and first uses its unbounded computational power to compute a random witness
w (according to uniform distributions of coin tosses ω subject to Inst(1n;ω) = (x,w), but where
ω is a random function of x). Then it prepares all possible random strings r ∈ {0, 1}N (where
N = poly(n)) for the prover’s algorithm in superposition. It then evaluates (a unitary version of)
the classical function Com() for computing the prover’s commitment on this superposition (and
on x) to get a superposition of all |r〉 |comx,r〉. It evaluates the random oracle H on the com-part,
i.e., to be precise, the hash values are stored in ancilla bits such that the result is a superposition
of states |r〉 |comx,r〉 |H(x, comx,r)〉. The adversary computes, in superposition, responses for all
values and finally measures in the computational basis, yielding a sample (r, comx,r, ch, rspx,w,r) for
ch = H(x, comx,r) where r is uniform over all random strings; it outputs the transcript (com, ch, rsp).
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Figure 3: An overview of our meta-reduction
The Meta-Reduction We illustrate the meta-reduction in Figure 3. Assume that there exists a
(quantum) black-box extractor KQ which on input x, sampled according to Inst, and which is also
given to AQ, is able to extract a witness w to x by running several resetting executions of AQ, each
time answering AQ’s (only) random oracle query |ϕ〉 by supplying a classical, possibly probabilistic
function h. We then build a (quantum) meta-reductionMQ which breaks the weak security of the
identification scheme in an active attack when communicating with the classical prover.
The quantum meta-reduction MQ receives as input the public statement x. It forwards it to
KQ and waits until KQ invokes AQ(x), which is now simulated by MQ. For each (reset) execution
the meta-reduction skips the step where the adversary would compute the witness, and instead
immediately computes the same superposition query |r〉 |comx,r〉 as AQ and outputs it to KQ.
When KQ creates (a description of) the possibly probabilistic function h we let MQ initiate an
interaction with the prover to receive a classical sample comx,r, on which it evaluates h to get a
challenge ch. Note that MQ in principle does not need a description of h for this, but only a
possibility to compute h once. The meta-reduction forwards the challenge to the prover to get
a response rsp. It outputs (com, ch, rsp) to the reduction. If the reduction eventually outputs a
potential witness w′ then MQ uses this value w′ to break the weak security.
3.4 Analysis
For the analysis note that the extractor’s perspective in each execution is identical in both cases,
when interacting with the actual adversary AQ, or when interacting with the meta-reductionMQ.
The reason is that the commitments are witness-independent such that the adversary (using its
computational power to first compute a witness) and the meta-reduction computing the commit-
ments without knowledge of a witness, create the same distribution on the query to the random
oracle. Since up to this point the extractor’s view is identical in both runs, its distribution on h is
also the same in both cases. But then the quantum adversary internally computes, in superposition
over all possible random strings r, the challenge ch ← h(x, comx,r) and the response rspx,w,r for
x,w, and ch. It then measures r in the computational basis, such that the state collapses to a
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classical tuple (comx,r, ch, rspx,w,r) over uniformly distributed r. Analogously, the meta-reduction,
upon receiving h (with the same distribution as in AQ’s attack), receives from the prover a com-
mitment comx,r for a uniformly distributed r. It then computes ch ← h(x, comx,r) and obtains
rspx,w,r from the prover, which is determined by x,w, r and ch. It returns (comx,r, ch, rspx,w,r) for
such a uniform r.
In other words, MQ considers only a single classical execution (with r sampled at the outset),
whereas AQ basically first runs everything in superposition and only samples r at the very end.
Since all the other computations in between are classical, the final results are identically distributed.
Furthermore, since the extractor is input-respecting, the meta-reduction can indeed answer all runs
for the very same x with the help of the external prover (which only works for x). Analogously,
the fact that the adversary always chooses, and uses, the same witness w in all runs, implies that
the meta-reduction can again rely on the external prover with the single witness w.
Since the all-powerful adversary succeeds with probability 1 in the original experiment, to
output a valid proof given x and access to a quantum random oracle only, the extractor must also
succeed with non-negligible probability in extracting a witness. Hence, MQ, too, succeeds with
non-negligible probability in an active attack against weak security. Furthermore, since KQ runs
in polynomial time, MQ invokes at most a polynomial number of interactions with the external
prover. Altogether, we thus obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 3.3 (Impossibility Result) For any Σ-protocol (P,V) with witness-independent com-
mitments, and which is weakly secure against active quantum adversaries, there does not exist an
input-preserving black-box quantum knowledge extractor for (P,V).
We note that our impossibility result is cast in terms of proofs of knowledge, but can be easily
adapted for the case of signatures. In fact, the adversary AQ would be able to compute a valid
proof (i.e., a signature) for any given message m which it receives as additional input to x.
Our Meta-Reduction and Classical Queries to the Random Oracle One might ask why
the meta-reduction does not apply to the Fiat-Shamir transform when adversaries have only classical
access to the random oracle. The reason is the following: if the adversary made a classical query
about a single commitment (and so would the meta-reduction), then one could apply the rewinding
technique of Pointcheval and Stern [PS00] changing the random oracle answers, and extract the
underlying witness via special soundness of the identification scheme. The quantum adversary here,
however, queries the random oracle in a superposition. In this scenario, as we explained above,
the extractor is not allowed to “read” the query of the adversary unless it makes the adversary
stop. In other words, the extractor cannot measure the query and then keep running the adversary
until a valid witness is output. This intrinsic property of black-box quantum extractors, hence,
makes “quantum” rewinding impossible. Note that rewinding in the classical sense —as described
by Pointcheval and Stern [PS00]— is still possible, as this essentially means to start the adversary
with the same random coins. One may argue that it might be possible to measure the query state
without disturbing AQ’s behavior significantly, but as we already pointed out, this would lead to a
non-black-box approach —vastly more powerful than the classical read-only access.
3.5 On the Necessity of Active Security
We briefly discuss that active security is basically necessary for an impossibility result as above.
That is, we outline a three-move protocol for any NP language which, when applying the FS trans-
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formation supports a straight-line extractor, and is honest-verifier zero-knowledge, but not actively
secure. This holds as long as there are quantum-immune dense encryption, and quantum-immune
non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. The latter are classical non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs (in the common random string model) for which simulated and genuine proofs are indistin-
guishable, even for quantum distinguishers. The former are encryption schemes which are IND-CPA
against quantum adversaries (see, for example, [BDF+11]) but where, in addition, honestly gener-
ated public keys are quantum-indistinguishable from random strings.
The construction is based on the (classical) non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge
of De Santis and Persiano [DP92] and works as follows: The first message is irrelevant, e.g., we
let the prover simply send the constant 0 (potentially padded with redundant randomness). In the
second message the verifier sends a random string which the prover interprets as a public key pk of
the dense encryption scheme and a common random string crs for the NIZK. The prover encrypts
the witness under pk and gives a NIZK that the encrypted value forms a valid witness for the public
value x. The verifier only checks the NIZK proof.
The protocol is clearly not secure against active (classical) adversaries because such an adversary
can create a public key pk via the key generation algorithm, thus, knowing the secret key and
allowing the adversary to recover the witness from a proof by the prover. It is, however, honest-
verifier zero-knowledge against quantum distinguishers because of the IND-CPA security and the
simulatability of the NIZK hide the witness and allow for a simulation. We omit a more formal
argument here, as it will be covered as a special case from our general result in the next section.
4 Positive Results for Quantum-Fiat-Shamir
In Section 3.5 we have sketched a generic construction of a Σ-protocol based on NIZKPoKs [DP92]
which can be converted to a secure NIZK-PoK against quantum adversaries in the QROM via the
Fiat-Shamir (FS) paradigm. While the construction is rather inefficient and relies on additional
primitives and assumptions, it shows the path to a rather efficient solution: drop the requirement
on active security and let the (honest) verifier choose the commitment obliviously, i.e., such that it
does not know the pre-image, together with the challenge. If the prover is able to use a trapdoor
to compute the c
4.1 Σ-protocols with Oblivious Commitments
The following definition captures the notion of Σ-protocols with oblivious commitments formally.
Definition 4.1 (Σ-protocols with Oblivious Commitments) A Σ-protocol (P,V) has obliv-
ious commitments if there are PPT algorithms Com and SmplRnd such that for any (x,w) ∈ R
the following distributions are statistically close:
• Let com = Com(x; ρ) for ρ← {0, 1}λ, ch← V(x, com), and rsp← P(x,w, com, ch).
Output (x,w, ρ, com, ch, rsp).
• Let (x,w, ρ, com, ch, rsp) be a transcript of a protocol run between P(x,w) and V(x),
where ρ← SmplRnd(x, com).
Note that the prover is able to compute a response from the given commitment com without
knowing the randomness used to compute the commitment. This is usually achieved by placing
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some extra trapdoor into the witness w. For example, for the Guillou-Quisquater RSA based
proof of knowledge [GQ90] where the prover shows knowledge of w ∈ Z∗N with we = y mod N for
x = (e,N, y), the prover would need to compute an e-th root for a given commitment R ∈ Z∗N . If
the witness would contain the prime factorization of N , instead of the e-th root of y, this would
indeed be possible.
Σ-protocols with oblivious commitments allow to move the generation of the commitment from
the prover to the honest verifier. For most schemes this infringes with active security, because a
malicious verifier could generate the commitment “non-obliviously”. However, the scheme remains
honest-verifier zero-knowledge, and this suffices for deriving secure signature schemes. In particular,
using random oracles one can hash into commitments by computing the random output of the hash
function and running Com(x; ρ) on this random string ρ to sample a commitment obliviously.
In the sequel we therefore often identify ρ with Com(x; ρ) in the sense that we assume that the
hash function maps to Com(x; ρ) directly. The existence of SmplRnd guarantees that we could
“bend” this value back to the actual pre-image ρ. In fact, for our positive result it would suffice
that the distributions are computationally indistinguishable for random (x,w) ← Inst(1n) against
quantum distinguishers.
4.2 FS Transformation for Σ-protocols with Oblivious Commitments
We explain the FS transformation for schemes with oblivious commitments for signatures only; the
case of (simulation-sound) NIZK-PoKs is similar, the difference is that for signatures the message
is included in the hash computation for signature schemes. For sake of concreteness let us give the
full description of the transformed signature scheme. We note that for the transformation we also
include a random string r in the hash computation (chosen by the signer). Jumping ahead, we
note that this source of entropy ensures simulatability of signatures; for classical Σ-protocols this
is usually given by the entropy of the initial commitment but which has been moved to the verifier
here. Recall from the previous section that we simply assume that we can hash into commitments
directly, instead of going through the mapping via Com and SmplRnd.
Construction 4.2 Let (P,V) be a Σ-protocol for relation R with oblivious commitments and in-
stance generator Inst. Then construct the following signature scheme S = (SKGen,Sig,SVf) in the
(quantum) random-oracle model:
Key Generation. SKGen(1λ) runs (x,w)← Inst(1λ) and returns sk = (x,w) and pk = x.
Signing. For message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ the signing algorithm SigH on input sk, picks random
r
$←− Rnd from some superpolynomial space, computes (com, ch) = H(pk,m, r), and obtains
rsp← P(pk, sk, com, ch). The output is the signature σ = (r, com, ch, rsp).
Verification. On input pk,m, and σ = (r, com, ch, rsp) the verification algorithm VfH outputs 1
iff V(pk, com, ch, rsp) = 1 and (com, ch) = H(pk,m, r); else, it returns 0.
Note that one can shorten the signature size by simply outputting σ = (r, rsp). The remaining
components (com, ch) are obtained by hashing the tuple (pk,m, r). Next, we give the main result
of this section saying that the Fiat-Shamir transform on Σ-protocols with oblivious commitments
yield a quantum-secure signature scheme.
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Theorem 4.3 If Inst is a hard instance generator for the relation R and the Σ-protocol (P,V) has
oblivious commitments, then the signature scheme in Construction 4.2 is existentially unforgeable
under chosen message attacks against quantum adversaries in the quantum-accessible random-oracle
model.
The idea is roughly as follows. Assume for the moment that we are only interested in key-only
attacks and would like to extract the secret key from an adversary AQ against the signature
scheme. For given x we first run the honest-verifier zero-knowledge simulator of the Σ-protocol to
create a transcript (com?, ch?, rsp?). We choose another random challenge ch′ ← {0, 1}`. Then,
we run the adversary, injecting (com?, ch′) into the hash replies. This appropriate insertion will
be based on techniques developed by Zhandry [Zha12b] to make sure that superposition queries
to the random oracle are harmless. With sufficiently large probability the adversary will then
output a proof (com?, ch′, rsp′) from which we can, together with (com?, ch?, rsp?) extract a witness
due to the special-soundness property. Note that, if this extraction fails because the transcript
(com?, ch?, rsp?) is only simulated, we could distinguish simulated signatures from genuine ones.
We can extend this argument to chosen-message attacks by simulating signatures as in the classical
case. This is the step where we take advantage of the extra random string r in order to make
sure that the previous adversary’s quantum hash queries have a negligible amplitude in this value
(x,m, r). Using techniques from [BBBV97] we can show that changing the oracle in this case does
not change the adversary’s success probability significantly.
4.3 Technical Results for the Security Proof
We start by recalling two results from Bernstein and Vazirani [BV97] and Bennett et al. [BBBV97]
which we make use of in the proof of Theorem 4.3. Before so, we introduce distance measures.
Distance Measures For two quantum states |ϕ〉 = ∑αx |x〉 and |ψ〉 = ∑βx |x〉 in superpo-
sition in the basis states |x〉, the Euclidean distance is given by (∑x |αx − βx|2 )1/2. The to-
tal variation distance (aka. statistical difference) of two distributions D0,D1 is defined through∑
x |Prob [D0 = x]− Prob [D1 = x]|. The following fact from [BV97] upperbounds the total vari-
ance distance in terms of the Euclidean distance:
Lemma 4.4 ([BV97, Lemma 3.6]) Let |ϕ〉 , |ψ〉 be quantum states with Euclidean distance at
most . Then, performing the same measurement on |ϕ〉 , |ψ〉 yields distributions with statistical
distance at most 4.
Let qρ(|φt〉) be the magnitude squared of ρ in the superposition of query t which we call the query
probability of r in query t. If we sum over all queries t, we get an upper bound on the total query
probability of r. The following is a result from Bennett et al [BBBV97].
Lemma 4.5 ([BBBV97, Theorem 3.3]) Let AQ be a quantum algorithm running in time T
with oracle access to H. Let  > 0 and let S ⊆ [1, T ]×{0, 1}n be a set of time-string pairs such that∑
(t,ρ)∈S qρ(|φt〉) ≤ . If we modify H into an oracle H ′ which answers each query ρ at time t by
providing the same string R (which has been sampled independently form H), then the Euclidean
distance between the final states of AQ when invoking H and H ′ is at most
√
T.
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Injecting Values into Oracles Let us now introduce some definitions and results including
so-called semi-constant distributions SCδ introduced by Zhandry [Zha12b].
Definition 4.6 (Semi-Constant Distributions) Let HX×Y = {H : X → Y } be a family of
functions for sets X and Y and let δ ∈ [0, 1]. We define the semi-constant distribution SCδ as
the distribution over HX×Y resulting from the following process:
• first, pick a random element y ∈ Y;
• then, for each x ∈ X do the following:
– with probability δ, set H(x) = y;
– otherwise, set H(x) to be a (uniformly) randomly chosen element in Y.
Notice that SC0 is the uniform distribution, while SC1 is a constant distribution. Also note that
the distribution, when used within an oracle, is consistent in the sense that the settings are chosen
once at the outset. We will use this definition to describe a quantum random oracle which has been
“reprogrammed” on a fraction δ of its possible inputs.
The following lemma by Zhandry [Zha12b] gives an upper bound on the probability that a
quantum algorithm’s output behavior changes when switching from a truly random oracle to an
oracle drawn from SCδ in terms of statistical distance:
Lemma 4.7 ([Zha12b, Corollary 4.3]) Let A|H〉Q be a quantum algorithm making at most qH
queries to the quantum-accessible random oracle H. Let δ ∈ (0, 1) and let H ′ be the oracle obtained
by reprogramming H on a fraction δ of its possible inputs, i.e., let H ′ be described by distribution
SCδ. Then, ∣∣∣A|H〉Q −A|H′〉Q ∣∣∣ ≤ 83 · q4Hδ2 .
Recall our quantum adversary AQ against the unforgeability property of the signature scheme
from Construction 4.2. It works by performing at most qH = poly(λ) queries to the quantum-
accessible random oracle. This means that the statistical distance in the two cases, and in particular
the probability ′ that A|H′〉Q successfully forges, is at least  − 83 · q4Hδ2. Hence, we can make
the probabilities arbitrarily small while still keeping δ noticeable (in the order of q−2H ). This is
important in order to extract the secret key successfully. Specifically, the following two (seemingly
contradictory) conditions have to be fulfilled:
• We need to ensure that AQ eventually outputs a valid signature (r, com?, ch′, rsp′) for some
message m for the commitment com? of our choice (the one we obtained from the zero-
knowledge simulator of the Σ-protocol which we inject into H’s responses). This requires
that com? appears with sufficiently large probability in the responses for oracle queries.
• Secondly, we still require that AQ has a small probability of distinguishing a true random
oracle H from the re-programmed one. Otherwise, the adversary may refuse to give a valid
signature at all.
The following lemma shows that both conditions can be satisfied simultaneously.
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Lemma 4.8 Let A|H〉Q as in Lemma 4.7, and let H ′ be the oracle obtained by reprogramming H
on a fraction δ of its possible inputs (pk,m, r) such that H ′(pk,m, r) = (com?, ch′) for values com?
and ch′. Let m, σ = (r, com, ch, rsp) be the output of A|H′〉Q on input pk. Then,
Pr
[
VfH
′
(pk,m, σ) = 1 ∧ (com, ch) = H ′(pk,m, r) = (com?, ch′)
]
≥ δ · − 8
3
· q4Hδ2 .
Proof. Consider the probability that we first run the adversary on the original oracle H and check
if it successfully forges a signature for message m, and then we also verify that its output (pk,m, r)
is thrown to (com?, ch′) under H ′. We claim that
Pr
[
VfH(pk,m, σ) = 1 ∧ H ′(pk,m, r) = (com?, ch′)] ≥  · δ.
This follows from the independence of the events: the oracle H ′ re-programs the output with
probability δ, independently of A’s behavior when interacting with oracle H. Next, we argue that
Pr
[
VfH
′
(pk,m, σ) = 1 ∧ H ′(pk,m, r) = (com?, ch′)
]
≥ δ · − 8
3
· q4Hδ2.
Note that the difference is now that the adversary interacts with oracle H ′, and that we also
verify the adversary’s success with respect to H ′. Instructively, the reader may imagine that,
after the adversary’s attack ends, we also check that H ′(pk,m, r) = (com?, ch′); the equation
H ′(pk,m, r) = (com, ch), as in the lemma’s claim, trivially follows already if verification holds.
According to the previous lemma, switching to oracle H ′ can change the distance of the output
distribution of A when playing against H ′ instead of H (including the final verification) by at most
8
3 · q4Hδ2. Hence, since the subsequent computation and check H ′(pk,m, r) = (com?, ch′) cannot
increase this distance, we conclude that the probability for event
VfH
′
(pk,m, σ) = 1 ∧ H ′(pk,m, r) = (com?, ch′) = (com, ch)
cannot be smaller than the claimed bound. 
The previous lemma informally tell us that, in order to succeed, we have to balance between a
large δ to increase the chances of the adversary outputting a signature containing our desired com?,
and a small δ to avoid that the adversary detects the reprogrammed oracle.
4.4 Security Proof
We are now ready to prove the main theorem.
Proof (of Theorem 4.3). We assume towards contradiction the existence of an efficient quantum
adversary AQ which, on input a public key pk, outputs a valid forgery (m,σ) under pk with non-
negligible probability , hence breaking the existential unforgeability of the signature scheme. This
adversary has access to a quantum-accessible random oracle H with H(pk,mi, rj) = (comi,j , chi,j),
and to a signing oracle § for the key sk producing, on input a classical stringsm, (classical) signatures
σ = (r, com, ch, rsp)← SigH(sk,m).
The adversary AQ gets pk as an input, and is then allowed to perform up to qH = poly(λ)
queries to H in superposition, and up to qS = poly(λ) classical queries to §. Recall that the signer
still operates on classical bits. Then, after running for poly(λ) time, adversary AQ produces (with
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probability ) a valid forgery (m,σ) under pk such that m has never been asked to the signing
oracle § throughout AQ’s execution (i.e., m is a fresh message). We assume that qH also covers
a classical query of the verifier to check the signature. Under these assumptions we show how to
build an efficient quantum adversary BQ, with access to AQ as a subroutine, and which is able to
break the scheme’s underlying hard mathematical problem with non-negligible probability. That
is, BQ on input x generated according to Inst(1λ), is able to output a valid witness w′ to statement
x, i.e., (x,w′) ∈ R. The adversary BQ works as follows:
• On input statement x, it first runs a simulation of the underlying Σ-protocol to obtain a valid
transcript (com?, ch?, rsp?). This is possible because of the honest-verifier zero-knowledge
property. Note also that this does not require access to the random oracle. Also note that we
assume for simplicity that the oblivious commitment is a random string; else we would need
to run SmplRnd on com? now to derive ρ, and use ρ in the hash reply (and argue that this
is indistinguishable).
• Then, BQ simulates an oracle H0 which is obtained by reprogramming a (simulated) quantum
random oracle H over a fraction δ of its possible inputs (pk,m, r) with the value (com?, ch′).
Here, δ is some non-negligible probability in the security parameter, and ch′ is a fix, arbitrarily
chosen challenge different from ch?. That is, H0(pk,m, r) = (com
?, ch′) with probability δ,
and random elsewhere.
• Next, BQ invokes AQ on input pk = x.
• Whenever AQ performs the i-th query to § for signing a message mi, adversary BQ does the
following:
– choose a random value ri
$←− Rnd;
– execute the honest-verifier zero-knowledge simulator Sim of the identification scheme,
obtaining a valid (simulated) transcript (comi, chi, rspi);
– reprogram Hi−1 with value (comi, chi) for the input (pk,mi, ri). We denote by Hi the
reprogrammed oracle after the i-th query to the signing oracle;
– then output the signature σi = (ri, comi, chi, rspi) as §’s reply to AQ.
• Finally, when AQ outputs a (hopefully valid) forgery (m,σ), where σ = (r, com, ch, rsp),
algorithm BQ aborts if com 6= com? or ch = ch?. Otherwise, it uses the special soundness
extractor Ext of the underlying Σ-protocol on input (com?, ch?, rsp?) and (com, ch, rsp) to
obtain a valid witness w′ for x.
Note that we can formally let BQ implement the hash evaluations by a classical algorithm with ac-
cess to a random oracle, basically hardwiring all changes due to re-programming into the code of the
algorithm. In a second step we can eliminate the random oracle, either via quantum-accessible pseu-
dorandom functions [BDF+11], or without any assumptions by using q-wise independent function
as shown in [Zha12b, Theorem 6.1]. These functions can be implemented by classical algorithms.
We next show that the success probability of our extraction procedure BQ is non-negligible
given a successful AQ. The proof follows the common game-hopping technique where we gradually
deprive the adversary a (negligible amount) of its success probability. We start with Game1 where
the adversary attacks the original scheme.
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Game1. This is AQ’s original attack on the signature scheme as constructed according to Con-
struction 4.2 initialized by public key pk. By assumption we have
Pr [AQ wins Game1] = 
for some non-negligible value .
Game2. This game is identical to Game1, except that we abort if AQ outputs a valid forgery (m,σ)
where σ does not contain the pre-selected commitment com? and challenge ch′. Furthermore,
we replace the quantum-accessible random oracle H with the oracle H0 drawn from a semi-
constant distribution SCδ. Recall that H0 is obtained by reprogramming H on a fraction δ
of its entries with the value (com?, ch′), where com? was obtained by a run of the honest-
verifier zero-knowledge simulator Sim on input x and ch′ was picked as in BQ’s simulation.
By Lemma 4.8 we have
Pr [AQ wins Game2] ≥ δ− 8
3
q4Hδ
2 .
Game
(1)
3 . As Game2, but this time H0 is reprogrammed to H1 (on the single point (pk,m1, r1))
as soon as AQ performs its 1st classical query m1 to §. From then on, the oracle H1 always
answers consistently with this value. We need to show that this switching does not change
the winning probability significantly. For this we basically need to show that, so far, the
amplitudes of this value (pk,m1, r1) in the queries to the quantum oracle are small, else the
adversary may be able to spot some inconsistency.
Let |Rnd| = 2n = exp (λ). We define the value (pk,m′i, r′j) to have high amplitude if there
exists at least one of the quantum queries |φ1〉 , |φ2〉 , . . . to the quantum-accessible oracle
H0 before the signing query, where the amplitude αi,j associated to the corresponding basis
element is such that |αi,j |2 ≥ 2−n2 . Otherwise, the tuple is said to have low amplitude. Note
that each query to the quantum oracle can have at most 2
n
2 tuples with high amplitude,
because the (square of the) amplitudes need to sum up to 1.
When H0 is reprogrammed to H1, the choice of m1 is fixed (i.e., determined by the 1
st query
of AQ to S), but r1 is still chosen uniformly at random in Rnd. Since AQ performs at most
qH queries to the quantum-accessible oracle according to H0 before the signing query, we have
thus at most qH · 2n2 tuples with high amplitude before this query. The probability of hitting
such a tuple is then given by:
Pr [(pk,m1, r1) has high amplitude] ≤ qH · 2
−n
2 . (1)
Moreover, provided (pk,m1, r1) has low amplitude, and since there are at most qH + qS query
steps, using Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.5 we obtain:∣∣∣A|H0〉Q −A|H1〉Q ∣∣∣ ≤ 4√(qH + qS) · 2−n2 . (2)
Let us assume, on behalf of the adversary, that AQ fails whenever (pk,m1, r1) has high
amplitude. Still, from equations (1) and (2), we have:
Pr
[
AQ wins Game(1)3
]
≥ Pr [AQ wins Game2]− 4
√
(qH + qS) · 2−n2 − qH · 2
−n
2
= δ− 8
3
q4Hδ
2 − negl (λ) .
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Here, we use the fact that reprogramming the oracle for (pk,m1, r1) does not change the
adversary’s success probability for a forgery for a fresh message m. That is, since the adver-
sary’s forgery is for m 6= m1,m2, . . . it cannot simply copy a signature query as a forgery, but
must still forge on the original oracle H0. Hence the argument about the winning probability
applies as it did for H0.
We now repeat at most q§ times the game hopping, from Game
(1)
3 to Game
(q§)
3 , every time
repeating the previous game but switching from Hi−1 to Hi during the ith query to §, each
time losing at most a negligible factor in the winning probability. Note that the probability
of hitting a high amplitude with the signature generation in each hop increases to at most
qH · 2−n2 + qS · 2−n when taking into account the at most qS hash queries in the previous
signature requests, but this remains negligible. After q§ steps we reach the following game.
Game
(q§)
3 . As Game2, but now H0 is dynamically reprogrammed as a sequence H1, . . . ,HqS
throughout all of the AQ’s queries to §. We have
Pr
[
AQ wins Game(qS)3
]
≥ δ− 8
3
q4Hδ
2 − negl (λ) .
Game4. As before, but now § is just simulated through the zero-knowledge simulator Sim of the
underlying Σ-protocol. If, by contradiction, AQ’s winning probability is affected by more
than a negligible amount in so doing, then we could use AQ to build an efficient distinguisher
between ‘real’ and ‘simulated’ transcripts of the Σ-protocol. This would require a distinguisher
with access to a random oracle, in order to simulate the game. According to [Zha12b, Theorem
6.1], however, we can simulate the oracle via q-wise independent functions (which exists
without requiring cryptographic assumptions). Furthermore, a hybrid argument can be used
to reduce the case of qS proofs to a single proof.
Pr [AQ wins Game4] ≥ δ− 8
3
q4Hδ
2 − negl (λ) .
Game5. Finally, in this game the special soundness extractor Ext is run on the transcript obtained
from AQ’s output from the previous game. Change the winning condition of AQ such that
the adversary wins if this extraction yields a valid witness w′ for x. If the winning probability
in this game is more than negligibly far from the winning probability of AQ in the previous
game then this can only be due to the fact that the simulated proof with (com?, ch?, rsp?)
cannot be accepted by the verifier; else the extractor would be be guaranteed to work for this
proof and the (accepted) signature. But this would allow an easy distinguisher against the
zero-knowledge property, similar to the previous games. Hence:
Pr [AQ wins Game5] ≥ δ− 8
3
q4Hδ
2 − negl (λ) .
Note that AQ’s winning condition in the final game corresponds exactly to the probability of BQ
successfully deriving a witness w′ for its input x. This winning probability can be maximized (by
zeroing the first derivative in δ) by choosing:
δ =
3
16q4H
.
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This yields:
Pr [AQ wins Game5] ≥ 3
2
16q4H
− negl (λ) ,
which is non-negligible. This concludes the proof of the main theorem. 
4.5 Example Instantiation
In this section, we present an instantiation of Σ-protocols with oblivious commitments which is
secure against quantum adversaries. We look at the lattice-based signature scheme by Lyuba-
shevsky [Lyu12] which is obtained by applying the FS transformation. The security of this sig-
nature scheme is reduced to the hardness of the Small Integer Solution (SIS) problem, which is
believed to be hard even for quantum algorithms.
Similarly, other works using the FS transformation and relying on the quantum hardness of the
underlying primitives, are not known to be necessarily secure against quantum adversaries, e.g.,
[Lyu09, BM10, GKV10, SSH11, Sak12, GLP12, AFLT12, CNR12, AJLA+12]. This holds also for
signature schemes obtained from the FS extension [ADV+12] for multi-pass identification protocols
(e.g., [CLRS10, CVA10, SSH11, Sak12]). Furthermore, the FS transform can be applied on the
identification and zero-knowledge protocols [MV03, Lyu08, KTX08, MGS11] as they are secure
against quantum adversaries. Still, the converted signature scheme is not necessarily quantum-
secure anymore. A similar patch approach, as we describe for [Lyu12], can also applied to most of
the aforementioned schemes.
Trapdoors to SIS instances We are going to illustrate how a Σ-protocol with oblivious com-
mitments can be obtained through our patch. Basically, we need to provide the prover with a
trapdoor to extract a candidate preimage to a given commitment. In the scheme from [Lyu12]
the prover has to solve an SIS instance. Roughly speaking, the prover has to find preimages for
functions fA(v) := Av for A
$←− Zn×mq where v is distributed according to the discrete Gaussian
distribution Ds over Zm with standard deviation s. The parameters q, n,m as well as s determine
the hardness of the SIS instance.
From [Ajt99, GPV08, AP09, Pei10, MP12] we know the existence of trapdoors allowing to sam-
ple such preimages. The most efficient construction from [MP12] finds preimages of length β ≈ s√m
for lattice dimension m ≈ 2n log q with (at least) s ≈ 16√n log q. Let T denote the trapdoor for
function fA which is generated together with matrix A
$←− Zn×mq by algorithm GenTrap(1n, 1m, q).
Then, the function SampleD(T,A,X, s) samples an element x from the distribution within negli-
gibly close (in n) statistical distance of Dms such that Ax = X (see, e.g., Algorithm 3 of [MP12]).
Our Patch on the ID Scheme within [Lyu12] We take as input the identification (ID) scheme
from which the signature scheme in [Lyu12] is derived from. Now, we provide the prover with
necessary trapdoor information in order to enable the prover to respond to a challenge for oblivious
commitments. The scheme is parameterized by security parameter n, q, d, k, and η. Moreover,
m ≈ 2n log q1, κ is chosen such that 2κ · (kκ) ≥ 2100, and s ≈ 12dκ√m.
1In the original paper, the author sets m ≈ 64 + n log q/ log(2d + 1). We slightly increase m in order to obtain a
trapdoor. This merely strengthens the underlying hardness.
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T,A← GenTrap(1n, 1m, q)
Prover P Verifier V
secret key: T, S
$←− {−d, . . . , 0, . . . , d}m×k
public key: A, R← AS public key: A, R
r
$←− {0, 1}λ r−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
c
$←− {v : v ∈ {−1, 0, 1}k, ‖v‖1 ≤ κ}
c,Y←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Y ← Ay for y $←− Dms
y′ ← SampleD(T,A,Y, s), z← Sc + y′
With probability 1− ρ abort; else z−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Accept iff
‖z‖ ≤ ηs√m and Rc = Y −Az
Figure 4: Patched Σ-Protocol from [Lyu12]
The prover first runs (A
$←− Zn×mq ,T) ← GenTrap(1n, 1m, q). The prover’s secret is a matrix
S
$←− {−d, . . . , 0, . . . , d}m×k and the trapdoor T . The corresponding public key consists of the ma-
trices A and R = AS. The prover P picks first a random string r $←− {0, 1}λ, and sends it over to
the verifier. The verifier V randomly picks a challenge c $←− V = {v : v ∈ {−1, 0, 1}k, ‖v‖1 ≤ κ}
and computes the commitment Y ← Ay for random y ∈ Zm sampled according to Dms . The
verifier forwards both c and Y to P. Now, P samples first a valid preimage y′ of Y under func-
tion fA through algorithm SampleD, and then computes z← Sc + y′. With a certain probability ρ
(depending on the public parameters, z, and Sc) the pair (z, c) is handed over to V. Upon receiving
z, V accepts iff ‖z‖ ≤ ηs√m and Rc = Y −Az. The underlying interactive scheme is also given
in Figure 4. Note that we can assume that ρ is sufficiently large such that we simply let the signer
occasionally fail; to get a valid signature repeatedly call the signer about the same message m.
On the Quantum Security We stress that the resulting (identification) scheme has now obliv-
ious commitments, i.e., it satisfies Definition 4.1.
Note that the security as an identification scheme does not depend on the first message sent
by the prover. However, if one converts the ID protocol to a signature scheme, this message
serves as the randomness input to the hash function together with the message to be signed. As
such, a signature on a message m consists of (randomized) σ = (r, rsp) where (com, ch) = (Y, c)←
H(pk, r,m). Hence, the signature scheme obtained by the FS transformation (see Construction 4.2)
on the above identification scheme is secure against quantum adversaries in the quantum-accessible
random-oracle model following from the result of Theorem 4.3.
Notice that our resulting signature scheme is close to a variant of the hash-and-sign signature
scheme (GPV) by Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan [GPV08]. The GPV signature scheme
uses a pre-images sampleable trapdoor function (PSF), and signing a message here is basically
providing a preimage to the hashed message. If in our construction, the commitment and challenge
is merely the hash of the message, both signatures coincide. In a concurrent work [BZ13], the
GPV signature scheme is proven secure in the QROM. Interestingly, this gives us two different
proof approaches for similar schemes. While Boneh and Zhandry [BZ13] give security results for
the hash-and-sign paradigm and thereby show the security of the GPV signature, our security
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proof follows immediately from Theorem 4.3 once the scheme by Lyubashevsky is patched to have
oblivious commitments. Note that, ideally, our result applies to future FS schemes with improved
efficiency as well.
5 Conclusion
Our impossibility result indicates that the Fiat-Shamir paradigm should be taken with great caution
when used to argue quantum resistance. A proof for a scheme in the classical random-oracle model,
even if the underlying problem is quantum-resistant, may not yield a protocol which is also secure in
the QROM. For some schemes, however, a formal proof in the quantum random oracle is possible
after a minor modification. Interestingly, this modification may first weaken the scheme, e.g.,
remove active security.
It remains open to bypass our black-box separation result by other means, e.g., by using witness-
dependent commitments, to extend the class of admissible protocols for which the transformation
yields a secure scheme in the QROM. Alternatively, one may try to give a “Fiat-Shamir-like”
transformation which also yields secure signature schemes in the QROM. Natural candidates would
be the constructions with online extractors by Pass [Pas03] and by Fischlin [Fis05], which potentially
also circumvent the rewinding problem. We leave this as an interesting open question.
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